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CASE COMMENTS
FAMILY LAW - FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE - MILITARY
RETIRED PAY NOT SUBJECT TO DIVISION AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
A military officer and his wife were divorced after nineteen
years of marriage.' At the time of the divorce,2 the husband had
served approximately eighteen of the twenty years required for
military retired pay under section 3911 of title 10 U.S.C.A. 3 In his
dissolution of marriage petition, the husband requested that all his
military retirement benefits be confirmed to him as his separate
property, so as not to be part of the community property of the
marriage, 4 which is divisible by California courts in marriage
dissolutions. 5
The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
1. McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981). Richard and Patricia McCarty were married
in Portland, Oregon, on March 3, 1957, during Richard McCarty's second year in medical school.
In his fourth year of medical school, Richard commenced active duty in the United States Army. He
was assigned successive tours of duty in Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Washington, D.C., California, and
Texas. After these tours of duty, he was assigned to a hospital in San Francisco, where he held the
rank of Colonel and became Chief ofCardiology. Id. at 2732-33.
2. Id. at 2733. Richard and Patricia McCarty were separated on October 31, 1976. On
December 1, 1976, Richard filed a petition in the Superior Court of California in and for the City
and County of San Francisco requesting dissolution of the marriage. Id.
3. 10 U.S.C.A. § 3911 (West 1959). Section 3911 provides that "[tihe Secretary of the Army
may, upon the officer's request, retire a regular or reserve commissioned officer of the Army who has
at least 20 years of service computed under section 3926 of this title, at least 10 years of which have
been active service as a commissioned officer." Id.
4, 101 S. Ct. at 2733. Under California law, a court granting dissolution of a marriage must
divide "the community property and the quasi-community property of the parties." CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 4800(a) (West Supp. 1981). Upon dissolution ofa marriage in California, each spouse has an equal
and absolute right to one-halfinterest in all community and quasi-community property. Each spouse
retains his or her separate property, including the assets the spouse owned before the marriage or
acquired separately during the marriage through gift. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
578 (1979).
5. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 577-78. Eight states, including Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington treat all property
owned by either spouse during the marriage as community property. In these community property
states, each spouse is deemed to make an equal contribution to the marital enterprise, and each is
entitled to share equally in its assets. Id.
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affirmed an award to the wife by a superior court 6 and held that the
husband's military pensions and retirement rights were subject to
division as quasi-community property.' In so ruling, the court
declined to accept the husband's contention that the federal scheme
of military retirement benefits preempts state community property
laws.8 The California Supreme Court denied the husband's
petition for hearing. 9 The husband appealed to the United States
Supreme Court,10 which held that federal law precludes a state court
from dividing military retired pay pursuant to state community
property laws." McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
Traditionally, the subject of domestic relations between
husband and wife has belonged to the states and not to the laws of
the United States.12 Thus, before the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution 13 demands that state law be overridden,
"state family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to
'clear and substantial' federal interests.' '14
The issue of whether federal law preempts state community
property laws was first addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in Wetmore v. Markoe. '5 In Wetmore the Court held that state
family law would be preempted only when Congress has
6. 101 S. Ct. at 2734. The decisions of the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District,
and the superior court are unpublished. See8 COMM. PROP.J. 71-72 (1981).
7. 101 S. Ct. at 2733-34. The California intermediate court in McCarty, I Civ. No. 45056, Div.
4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1980), affirmed the trial court's finding that the husband's military
retirement pension was quasi-community property, to be divided by a formula based upon the ratio
of the length of the husband's service during the marriage and the total length of service to
retirement. Id. at 2734. Quasi-community property rules apply when parties who have acquired
property rights in other states become domiciled in California and a divorce action is subsequently
filed in that state. The husband in McCarty claimed domicile in Oregon. See 8 COMM. PROP.J. at 72.
8. 101 S. Ct. at 2734. The husband argued that the supremacy clause of the Constitution
precluded the trial court from awarding his wife a portion of his military retired pay. 101 S. Ct. at
2734.
Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution states the following:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the supremacy clause mandates that the United States
Constitution and the laws of the United States cannot be impaired by any law ofa state. Ifa state law
conflicts with the United States Constitution, or with any valid law of the United States, it is utterly
nugatory. SeeU.S.C.A. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 n.I (West 1968).
9. 101 S. Ct. at 2734.
10. Id. After postponing jurisdiction in 1980, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
the McCarty case fell within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. McCarty v, McCarty, 101 S. Ct.
314, 314 (1980). The conflict between the federal military retirement scheme and state community
property laws made this a proper case for appellate .jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court
under the supremacy clause. 101 S. Ct. at 2734 n. 12 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
11. 101 S. Ct. at 2743.
12. See, e..g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581.
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For the text of article VI, clause 2, see supra note 8.
14. 439 U.S. at 581 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341,352 (1966)).
15. 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
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"positively required by direct enactment ' 16 that state law be
preempted. 17
The following year, however, the Court in McCune v. Essig 8
held that community property laws could be preempted by the
Federal Homestead Act,1 9 even though Congress had not made an
express statement limiting ownership in the Federal Homestead
Act.20 The fact that the rights under the Federal Homestead Act
already had been delineated was enough for the Court to find that
those rights could not be modified further by state community
property laws without frustrating the purpose behind their
enactment. 21 Therefore, the pervasive regulation of the area by the
Federal Homestead Act impliedly preempted the states from
further action. 22
In more recent cases the United States Supreme Court has
pointed to express preemption of state regulation by identifying
unequivocal statements of ownership in the appropriate federal
statutes. 23 In Wissner v. Wissner24 the Court refused to divide the
proceeds of a National Serviceman's Life Insurance Policy
purchased with community funds between the wife and the named
beneficiary. 25 The Wissner Court stated that Congress had spoken
"with force and with clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to
the named beneficiary and no other. ",26
16. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
17. Id. The Court in Wetmore held that a husband has a duty to support his wife and children and
the Federal Bankruptcy Act was not intended to be a means of avoiding this obligation. Id.
18. 199 U.S. 382 (1905). The Court in McCune held that federal law, which permitted a widow
to patent federal land entered by her husband, prevailed over the interest in the patent asserted by
the daughter under the state inheritance law. Id. at 389. The Court noted that the daughter's
contention "reverses the order of the statute and gives the children an interest paramount to that of
the widow through the laws of the State." Id.
19. McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382. 389 (1905) (construing Homestead Act of 1874, ch. 308, 18
Stat. 81)(recent version at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 164, 171 (West 1964) (repealed 1976)).
20. Id. at 389. The actual conflict may occur in an implied manner, such as when Congress
already had acted to regulate the right in question and its actions are so pervasive as to occupy the
field. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAW § 6-25 (1978).
21. 199 U.S. at 390.
22. Id. (construing Homestead Act of 1874, ch. 308, 18 Stat. 81) (recent version at 43 U.S.C.A.
164, 171 (West 1964) (repealed 1976)).
23. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (express conflict between Federal
Railroad Retirement Act and state community property laws); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 633 (1962)
(express conflict between state community property law and Federal Treasury regulations regarding
United States Savings Bonds); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, rehg denied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950)
(express conflict between National Service Life Insurance Act and California community property
law).
24. 338 U.S. 655, reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 926 (1950). In Wissner a state court had ordered the
named beneficiary of a National Serviceman's Life Insurance Policy, purchased through a federal
program, to turn over one-half of the proceeds to the deceased soldier's widow as community
property. Id.
25. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. at 658. The Supreme Court in Wissner held that the state
order was invalid under the supremacy clause, because the congressional intent in forming the
insurance plan was to give servicemen absolute discretion in choosing their benficiaries. Thus, state
community property law could not be applied because it conflicted with federal law. Id. at 558-59.
26. Id.
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In Free v. Bland 27 the Court held that, pursuant to specific
federal survivorship provisions, 28 the sole owner of the United
States Savings Bonds could be only the survivor of the registered
owners, and therefore, no community property interest could
attach. 2 9
The most recent case prior to McCarty was Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo. 30 In Hisquierdo the United States Supreme Court held
that community property states could not apply their laws in
dividing, as part of the community property, the benefits received
under the Federal Railroad Retirement Act. 31 The Court applied a
two-step test in order to determine whether the federal law
preempted the state community property law. 32 Under the two-step
preemption test, a state law will be preempted if the right asserted
by the state actually conflicts with the express terms of the federal
law and the application of state law threatens grave harm to "clear
and substantial federal interests. 33 In Hisquierdo the Court noted a
specific nonattachability clause in the Railroad Retirement Act
that governed railroad worker's pensions3 4 and a clause that
entitled the spouse to a separate payment. 35 The existence of these
27. 369 U.S. 663 (1962). Federal Treasury regulations providing for the right of survivorship in
the ownership of United States Savings Bonds were in express conflict with state community
property laws. Id. at 665.
28. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. at 667-68. The plaintiff sought community property rights in
United States Savings Bonds, even though duly issued Treasury regulations provided that the
designated co-owners would, upon the death of the other co-owner, be the "sole and absolute
owner" of the bonds. Treas. Reg. § 315.61 (currently codified at 31 C.F.R. 5 315.61 (1981)).
29. 369 U.S. at 670.
30. 439 U.S. 572 (1979). The California community property award to the wife of interest in the
husband's expected benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, was held to impermissibly
conflict with the Federal Railroad Retirement Act. Id. at 590-91 (construing 45 U.S.C.A. § 231-
231t (West Supp. 1981)).
31. Id. (construing 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 231-231t (West Supp. 1981)).
32. Id. at 583. The first issue the Court in Hisquierdo considered was whether the asserted state
right conflicted with the express terms of federal law. Applying the second step of the federal
preemption test, the Court considered whether the consequences of applying the state law sufficiently
injured the objectives of the federal program and therefore required nonrecognition of that state
right. Id.
33. Id. at 581 (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
34. Id. Section 14 of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 provides:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, territory or
the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable or be
subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any
circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated.
45 U.S.C.A. § 231m. (West Supp.. 1981).
The closest analogue to section 14 of the Railroad Retirement Act in the Military Retirement
Statutes, which are involved in the McCarty case, is section 701(a), title 37, of the United States Code
Annotated. Section 701(a) provides the following: "Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, a commissioned officer of the Army
or Air Force may transfer or assign his pay account, when due and payable." 37 U.S.C.A. S 701(a)
(West 1968).
35. 439 U.S. at 584-85. Under the Railroad Retirement Act, a spouse is entitled to a separate
benefit, which terminates upon divorce. 45 U.S.C.A. § 231d (c) (3) (West Supp. 1981). No similar
separate spousal entitlement, terminable upon divorce, exists in statutes governing military retired
pay. See 101 S. Ct. at 2746.
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specific clauses indicated that Congress had provided for that
interest already. 36 Therefore, state community property laws were
not to interfere with the interest provided for by the federal
statute.
37
In McCarty v. McCarty38 the Court had to decide whether
federal military retired pay statutes preempted state community
property law. 39 The Court applied the Hisquierdo two-step test to
decide the issue. 40 The United States Supreme Court in McCarty
held that federal law precludes a state court from dividing military
retired pay pursuant to state community property laws. 41
In analyzing the first step of the Hisquierdo test, the McCarty
Court looked to several factors and found a conflict between the
terms of the federal military statutes and the state community
property right asserted by the wife.4 2 The Court noted that the
military retirement system conferred no entitlement to retired pay
upon the retired service member's spouse.4 3 Therefore, the Court
viewed the system as embodying not even a limited community
property concept. 44 Also, the Court noted that Congress had
explicitly stated that "historically military retired pay has been a
personal entitlement payable to the retired member himself as long as
he lives.'' 45
The McCarty Court looked to several other features of the
military retirement scheme to demonstrate that military retired pay
was meant to be the "personal entitlement" of the retiree. 46 One
factor was that a service member has the freedom to designate
someone other than the spouse or ex-spouse as a beneficiary to
receive unpaid arrearages in retired pay. 47 Another factor the
Court considered was that the language, structure, and legislative
36. 439 U.S. at 585.
37. Id. at 589.
38. 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
39. Id. at 2730.
40. Id. at 2735.
41. Id. at 2730. In determining whether the federal statute preempted state community property
law, the Court in McCarty reasoned that the first step was to determine whether the state right, as
asserted, conflicted with the express terms of the federal law involved. If there was a conflict, the
second step was to determine whether the consequences of the application of the state law sufficiently
inured the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecognition of the state right. Id. at 2735
(citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 583).
42. 101 S. Ct. at 2735.
43. Id. at 2737-41.
44. Id. at 2737.
45. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 865, 3294 (emphasis added by the Court)).
46. 101 S. Ct. at 2737. The wife argued that Congress's use of the term "personal entitlement"
in this context signified only that retired pay ceases upon the death of the service member. Id.
47. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C.A. S 2771 (West 1975)). The fact that section 2771 was designed to
permit the soldier to designate a beneficiary other than his spouse for his retired pay demonstrates
that Congress did not use the term "personal entitlement" in so limited a fashion as to mean only
that retired pay ceases upon the death of the service member, as the wife contended. Id. at 2737.
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history of the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan
(R.S.F.P.P.) 48 and the Survivor Benefit Plan (S.B.P.)4 9 indicated
that military retired pay was a "personal entitlement. "50 Under
these statutes, the service member has the freedom to elect to
provide no annuity at all, or to provide an annuity payable only to
surviving children and not to the spouse. 51 The Court used this fact
to conclude that if military retired pay was intended to be
community property, the service member could not deprive the
spouse of his or her interest in the property as provided by statute. 52
The Court also considered the fact that under the federal
military retired pay statutes,53 an ex-spouse is not an eligible
beneficiary of an annuity under either the R.S.F.P.P. or S.B.P.54
In addition, the Court noted that deductions from retired pay for a
spouse's annuity under the R.S.F.P.P. automatically cease upon
divorce, 55 so as "[tlo safeguard the participant's future retired pay
when... divorce occurs...."I'
The Court found it clear that Congress had intended that
military retired pay "actually reach the beneficiary" 57 by looking
to the fact that the retired pay cannot be attached to satisfy a
property settlement incident to the dissolution of a marriage. 58 The
Army officer may assign his retired pay only when it is due and
payable. 59
The Court recognized that the legislative history and
amendments of other federal retirement systems gave weight to the
48. 10 U.S.C.A. 5§ 1431-1446 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981). Generally, military retired pay
ceases upon the death of the service member, but the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan
(R.S.F.P.P.) and the Survivor Benefit Plan (S.B. P.) allow the service member to reduce the retired
pay in order to provide an annuity for the surviving spouse or children, if the service member so
elects. Id.
49. 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 1447-1455 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981).
50. 101 S. Ct. at 2738.
51. 10 U.S.C.A. §5 1434, 1450 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981). The fact that the service member is
free to elect whether to provide an annuity for the spouse indicates that the retired pay was meant to
be a "personal entitlement," under the sole control of the retired service member, rather than
community property. 101 S. Ct. at 2738.
52. 101 S. Ct. at 2738.
53. 10 U.S.C.A. §5 1434(a), 1447(3), 1450(a) (West Supp. 1981). Section 1434(a) refers to the
R.S.F.P.P., and sections 1447(3) and 1450(a) refer to the S.B.P. Id.
54. 101 S. Ct. at 2739.
55. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1434(c) (West 1975),
56. S. REP. No. 1480, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD.
NEws 865, 3294.
57. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 584.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 2739. Legislative history shows that Congress rejected a proposal that would
have allowed attachment of up to 50 % of military retired pay to comply with a court order in favor of
a spouse, former spouse, or child. H. R. REP. No. 481, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CoDE CONG. & An. NEws 816, 3288. S. REP. No. 1089, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 816, 3288.
59. 37 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (West 1968). While an Army officer may transfer or assign his pay
account, he may do so only when the account is "due and payable." 37 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (West
1968). Even if section 701 is not considered to be an explicit prohibition against anticipation, the
Court stated that "it is clear that the injunction against attachment is not to be circumvented by the
simple expedient ofan offsetting award." 101 S. Ct. at 2739 n.22.
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Court's conclusion that there was a conflict between the federal
military retirement scheme and the community property right
asserted. 60 In 1975 Congress amended the Social Security Act to
provide that all federal benefits, including military benefits, be
subject to legal process to enforce child support or alimony
obligations.6 1 In 1977, however, the Court further noted that
Congress defined "alimony" so as not to include any payment or
transfer of property in compliance with any community property
settlement or equitable distribution of property. 62
The Court also noted that the Civil Service statutes were
amended recently to require that the United States recognize
community property division of Civil Service retirement benefits
by state courts. 63 The Foreign Service Amendments were also
amended so that an ex-spouse is entitled to a pro rata share of
Foreign Service retirement benefits. 64 From these amendments to
similar federal retirement statutes, the McCarty Court implied that
since Congress had not authorized or required the community
property division of military retired pay, that pay continued to be
the personal entitlement of the retiree. 65 Therefore, the first step of
60. 101 S. Ct. at 2740-41. The Court looked at the legislation concerning other types of federal
pay, because Congress had determined that the problem of the attachment of military retired pay
should be considered in the context of "legislation that might require all Federal pays to be sub *ected
to attachment." 110 CONG. REC. 30151 (remarks of Rep. Pike). The Court noted that Congress
subsequently had acted to amend other federal pay systems regarding attachability but did not
amend the Federal Military Retired Pay statutes. 101 S. Ct. at 2741.
61. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 659 (West Supp. 1981). Monies due from, or payable by, the United States
or the District of Columbia to any individual, including members of the armed services, are subject
to legal process brought for the enforcement of he individual's legal obligation to pay child support
or alimony, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States or the District of Columbia
were a private person. Id.
62. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 662(c) (West Supp. 1981). Congress added a new definitional section, which
provides that the term "alimony" in section 659(a) of title 42, United States Code Annotated, does
not include payment or transfer of property in compliance with any community property settlement,
equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses.
Id.
63. 5 U.S.C.A. 5 8345(j) (1) (West 1980). Section 8345(j) (1) reads as follows:
Payments under this subchapter which would otherwise be made to an employee,
Member, or annuitant based upon his service shall be paid (in whole or in part) by the
Office to another person if and to the extent expressly provided for in the terms of any
court decree of divorce, annulment, or legal separation, or the terms of any court
order or court-approved property settlement agreement incident to any court decree of
divorce, annulment, or legal separation. Any payment under this paragraph to a
person bars recovery by any other person.
Id.
64. Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, S 814, 94 Stat. 2113. A former spouse who
was married to a foreign service member for at least 10 years of service is entitled to a pro rata sharv
of up to 50% of the member's retirement benefits, unless otherwise provided by court order or
spousal agreement. The former spouse also may claim a pro rata share of the survivor's annuity
provided for the member's widow. The foreign service membec cannot elect not to provide for a
survivor's annuity without the consent of his spouse or former spouse. Id.
65. 101 S. Ct. at 2741. After noting that similar legislation affecting military retired pay was
introduced in the 96th Congress and none of those bills were reported out of committee, the McCarty
Court stated: "Thus, in striking contrast to its amendment of the Foreign Service and Civil Service
retirement systems, Congress has neither authorized nor required the community property division
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the Hisquierdo preemption test was met.
The second step of the preemption test was to determine
whether the application of community property principles to
military retired pay sufficiently injured the objectives of the federal
program so as to require nonrecognition. 66 The Court found that
the application of state community property law had the potential
to frustrate the federal goals of inducing enlistment and
reenlistment into the armed forces, encouraging retirement after
twenty years of service to provide for a youthful military, and
providing for the retired service member. 67 The Court also found
that the application of state community property law might disrupt
the carefully balanced federal scheme that Congress devised to
encourage a service member to set aside a portion of his or her
military pay as an annuity for a surviving spouse or dependent
children. 68
The Court found a "clear and substantial" federal interest in
attracting and retaining personnel for the military forces, which are
essential for the national defense. 69 Thus, the states should not
interfere by lessening the incentive to enlist and retire set up by
Congress.70
The McCarty Court thus held that federal law precludes a state
court from dividing military retired pay pursuant to state
of military retired pay. On the contran', that pay continues to be the personal entitlement of the
retiree." Id. at 2740-41.
Legislation has been introduced in the 97th Congress that would require pro rata division of
military retired pay. See 8 COMM. PROP..J. 288, 290 (1981), referrin to H. R. REP. No. 3039, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. REP. No. 888, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2741. The McCarty Court quoted the language used in the Hisquierdo decision to
describe the second step: - '[a] mere conflict in words is not sufficient'; the question remains whether
the 'consequences of that [community property right] sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal
program to require nonrecognition.' " Id. (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581-83).
67. Id. Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the power to raise and support
armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §8, cls. 12-14.
68. 101 S. Ct. at 2741. The McCarty Court stated the following: "By diminishing the amount
available to the retiree, a community property division makes it less likely that the retired service
member will choose to reduce his or her retired pay still further by purchasing an annuity for the
surviving spouse, if any, or children." Id.
69. Id. at 2742. The wife in McCarty conceded that there is a substantial federal interest in
attracting and retaining personnel for the military forces. She argued, however, that this federal
interest would not be impaired by allowing a state to apply its community property laws to retired
military personnel in the same manner that the state applies those laws to civilians. The Court found
that this argument ignored two essential characteristics of military service: the military forces are
nationwide in operation; and the members of the military, unlike civilian employees, are not free to
choose their place of residence. Id. Thus, the value of the military retired pay as an inducement for
enlistment and reenlistment would be diminished to the extent that the service member recognizes
that he or she could be involuntarily transferred to a community property state that will divide that
pay upon divorce. Id.
70. Id. at 2743. The Court emphasized that "in no area has the Court accorded Congress
greater deference than in the conduct and control of military affairs." Id. The Court stated that the
decision concerning community property division of military retired pay is for Congress alone.
Absent any congressional decision, as in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, the Court
held that the states may not apply community property laws to federal military retired pay. Id.
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community property laws.71 The Court found a conflict between
the terms of the state and federal laws, and viewed the application
of the state law as having the potential to sufficiently injure the
objectives of the federal program so as to require nonrecognition of
the state right.72
The McCarty decision will bring changes in the application of
state law to military retirement pay in many states.73 Prior to the
McCarty decision, six of the eight community property states
considered military retirement pay as a community asset and
therefore divisible upon divorce. 74 Non-community property states
were divided on the issue of whether military retired pay could be
considered marital property subject to division upon divorce. 75
The North Dakota Supreme Court held in Webber v. Webber76
that the McCarty decision applies to the distribution of a former
husband's military retirement benefits in the North Dakota
courts. 77 Even though North Dakota is not a community property
state, the North Dakota Supreme Court applied the holding in
McCarty, such that the former husband's military retired pay could
not be attached to satisfy a property settlement incident to
71. Id. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Id.
72. Id. at 2741-42.
The dissent was bothered by the fact that Congress had not "positively required by direct
enactment" that state community property laws be preempted by the federal provisions governing
military retired pay. Id, at 2743 (Rehnquist, Brennan, & Stuart, JI.., dissenting) (quoting Wetmore
v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
The dissenters also stated that marriage law questions should be left to the states, as they have
been in the past, unless there is the "clearest direction from Congress." Id. at 2744. The dissenters
did not find this "clear direction" in the federal military statutes. Id. The dissenters stated that a
policy issue such as this was for Congress alone to decide, and since Congress had not explicitly acted
to prevent the application of state community property laws to military retired pay, the state law
should not be preempted by the federal military retirement system. Id. at 2748.
73. See 8 COMM. PROP. J. 187, 194-95 (1981) (discussion on the effect of McCarty on alimony,
off-sets, in-hand retired pay, and equitable distribution of marital property).
74. The highest state courts in California, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, and Washington have
considered military retired pay a community asset. See, e.g., Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 466,
600 P.2d 1098 (1979); Marriage ofMilhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980);
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1979); Stephens v. Stephens, 93 N.M. 1, 595 P.2d
1196 (1979); Payne v. Payne, 82 Wash. 2d 573, 512 P.2d 736 (1973). But see Trahan v. Trahan, 609
S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). Nevada does not appear to have spoken authoritatively on the
subject.
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana held that the federal supremacy clause prohibited application
ofcommunity property law to military retired pay. DeDon v. DeDon, 390 So. 2d 937 (La. Ct. App.
1980).
75. Some courts in non-community property states have held that military retired pay is not part
of the marital property subject to division upon divorce. See, e.g., Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230
(Alaska 1979); Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Hill v. Hill, 47 Md. App.
460, 424 A.2d 779 (1981); Howard v. Howard, 196 Neb. 351, 242 N.W.2d 884 (1976).
Courts in other non-community property states have held that federal law did not prevent state
courts from giving consideration to the husband's military retired pay when formulating the
economic terms of a marriage dissolution decree. See, e.g., Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421
(Iowa 1980); Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155, cert. denied, 442 U.S. 940,
reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1978); Ebert v. Ebert,__ Mont. __, 616 P.2d 379 (1980).
76. 308 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1981).77. Webber v. Webber, 308 N.W.2d 548, 549 (N.D. 1981).
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dissolution of the marriage.7 8 The McCarty decision, however, left
unanswered the issue of whether military retired pay should be
classified as deferred compensation or current income.79 Thus, the
Webber decision was based on the fact that the McCarty Court found
the military retirement benefits to be the former serviceman's
"personal entitlement," not subject to express partition according
to state community property law. 80
It is likely that the McCarty decision will be applied to military
disability pensions. 81 It may be argued that Congress intended the
disability pay to be the "personal entitlement" of the disabled
service member, and that the federal goals in providing military
disability pay would be frustrated in much the same manner as
explained in McCarty. 8 2
It is unclear whether the McCarty decision could be applied in
community property states in such an inequitable manner as to
allow the retired service member to receive a portion of his or her
spouse's nonmilitary pension, while the service member's spouse
would not be able to receive a portion of the military retired pay. 83
Some community property states may need to reevaluate their laws
on equitable distribution of property. 84
Unless Congress acts to amend the military retired pay
statutes in the near future, 85 spouses of service members should
plan their retirement accordingly. Spouses who have relied upon
sharing the pension of a military service member must turn to




79. 308 N.W.2d at 549 (citing McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. at 2736).
80. 308 N.W.2d at 549.
81. 10 U.S.C.A. 5§ 1201-1221 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981).
82. 101 S. Ct. 2741-43.
83. See Reppy, Learning to Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COMM. PROP. .1. 5, 10 (1979) (the author
suggests various inequitable applications of the ruling in Hisquierdo).
84. Id. Divorce courts in Idaho, Washington, or Texas can make an unequal division of
community property to achieve a just distribution of property at divorce. Id.
85. See 101 S. Ct. at 2743. The Court in McCarty recognized that "Congress may well decide, as
it has in the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more protection should be afforded a
former spouse of a retired service member." Id. The Court would defer to Congress in any such
congressional enactment. Id.
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